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Abstract
This Article will discuss the historical context in which the competition law enforcement
structures of the European Union and United States were created, describe the dual enforcement
structures, and explain current efforts to coordinate the two levels of enforcement. It will conclude
with observations about the nature of dual enforcement under the two systems. More specifically,
it will argue that the European Union should create an enforcement system, which might allow
more collaboration and cooperation between the Commission and the European Union Member
States.
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INTRODUCTION
Competition laws in the United States and the European
Union are implemented through a dual enforcement system.
The split of antitrust enforcement authority between federal and
state officials reflects the U.S. Constitution's division of power
between federal and state governments. "Antitrust federalism"
has come to signify that the state and federal governments play
distinct, yet complementary roles in regulating the competitive
process.
In contrast, in the European Union, the split of enforce-
ment authority is governed by the principle of subsidiarity,
which requires that the Community take action "only if and in so
far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States."' In recent years, the Commis-
sion, overburdened with notifications under Article 85 and com-
plaints under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty Establishing the
* This Article was presented on November 20, 1995, at an International
Conference entitled, "Antitrust: Rules, Institutions, and International Relations." The
Conference was held at the AutoritA Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato in Rome.
** Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Brussels; Director, Fordham
Corporate Law Institute, New York.
*** Consultant to Directorate General IV; PhD candidate, European University
Institute, Florence, Italy.
1. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247, art. 3b [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act,
O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISH-
INC THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC O0l Pub. Off. 1987)).
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European Community ("EC Treaty"),2 has made efforts to effec-
tuate the subsidiarity principle through its project to encourage
decentralized enforcement of Community competition law. In
this way, subsidiarity forms the basis for the Commission's alloca-
tion of tasks between itself and the Member States.
In both jurisdictions, authorities at the two levels continue
to make efforts to define and shape their proper roles in the
enforcement scheme, to coordinate enforcement, and to utilize
scarce enforcement resources in the most efficient manner.
State antitrust authorities in the United States have made pro-
gress along these lines in recent years through the National Asso-
ciation of Attorneys General ("NAAG"). Perhaps the EU Mem-
ber States would benefit from establishing a similar organization.
This Article will discuss the historical context in which the
two systems were created, describe the dual enforcement struc-
tures, and explain current efforts to coordinate the two levels of
enforcement. It will conclude with observations about the na-
ture of dual enforcement under the two systems. More specifi-
cally, it will argue that the European Union should create an
enforcement system which might allow more collaboration and
cooperation between the Commission and the EU Member
States.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH FEDERAL ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT WAS CREATED
A. United States
Prior to the enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sher-
man Act") in 1890,1 a number of states took the initiative to pros-
ecute the trusts of the day for their restrictive practices. This was
done mainly through the use of corporation law and common
law restraint of trade principles. The state of Kansas enacted the
first antitrust law in 1889,4 and at least twelve other states did the
same.5 Fourteen states and territories adopted constitutional
2. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by TEU, supra note 3.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1994).
4. Act of March 9, 1889, ch. 257, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389.
5. HANS B. THORELLI,.THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 155-60 (1954); Andrew I.
Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federalism, 61 CEo. WASH. L.
RE%,. 657, 658 nn.2, 3 (1993).
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prohibitions of monopolies or other anticompetitive business
forms before the Sherman Act became law.6 However, given the
national dimension of the most important trusts, most notori-
ously the oil and sugar trusts, as well as their ability to restructure
in order to evade problematic state laws, state enforcement
quickly proved inadequate.
The Sherman Act7 was conceived as a means of supplement-
ing state antitrust enforcement, and the states were enthusiastic
proponents of the enactment of a federal antitrust law.' Follow-
ing the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton
Act in 1914,9 federal antitrust enforcement largely dominated
state antitrust enforcement. Until the 1980's, state antitrust en-
forcement played a relatively minor role and focused primarily
on local matters, such as bid-rigging on state contracts.
The 1980's marked the period of greatest conflict during
the 100 year co-existence of federal and state antitrust enforce-
ment regimes. With the arrival of the Reagan Administration,
federal enforcement was greatly reduced and was limited to
prohibiting cartels and large horizontal mergers. In response,
state antitrust enforcement was re-awakened, and its focus ex-
panded to cover not only local matters, but also matters of multi-
state or national scope. The NAAG formed an Antitrust Com-
mittee not only to aid enforcement of state antitrust laws, but
also to promote state enforcement of federal antitrust laws
through the various means available to the states. One area in
which the state response was particularly evident was vertical re-
straints. The states remained vigilant in their enforcement in this
area and published their own vertical enforcement guidelines in
response to non-enforcement and more relaxed guidelines
which had been published by federal enforcers.
With the arrival of the Bush administration, the period of
limited federal enforcement came to an end, and federal agen-
cies once again began to enforce federal antitrust laws more
strictly. The states have remained active, however, and many
states have increased their antitrust enforcement efforts in
recent years.10 Currently, all fifty states and the six territories11
6. THORELLI, supra note 5, at 155.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1994).
8. Gavil, supra note 5, at 660 n.9.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994).
10. Interview with Milton A. Marquis, Senior Counsel to the Assistant Attorney
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have either a state antitrust statute or constitutional provisions to
enforce antitrust violations. Although most of the states' anti-
trust provisions are patterned on or are analogous to the Sher-
man Act, 12 prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade and mo-
nopolization, they nonetheless vary from state-to-state and do
not always coincide with federal antitrust law. Twelve states13
and Puerto Rico also have merger control statutes analogous to
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Many state statutes provide that
they are to be interpreted consistently with federal precedent,
and, generally, this is done.14
B. European Union
The history of the relationship between Community and
Member State antitrust enforcers differs greatly from the rela-
tionship between the U.S. Federal Government and its states.
The difference stems from the widely varying histories, cultures,
and traditions with respect to economic organization of the fif-
teen EU Member States and the role of the state in law enforce-
ment. Prior to the formation of the European Community in
1957, France and Germany were the only founding nations to
have competition laws. Enforcement of such laws, however, was
virtually non-existent. The French and German industrial econ-
omy was subject to control by state interventionism, either
through nationalism combined with uncontrolled state aid, over-
regulation of industry, or both. These states did not accept or
rely upon the market mechanism as a means of controlling the
industrial economy. The Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community ("Treaty of Rome")15 incorporated this fun-
damental principle, namely, acceptance and reliance upon the
market mechanism as the means of controlling the industrial
economy and the substantive rules to control restrictive agree-
General for Antitrust, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Interview with
Milton A. Marquis].
11. The territories are the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
12. William J. Milliken & Stewart C. Myers, State Attorneys General and Antitrust
Enforcement 2, 4 (1995) (unpublished paper, on file with the authors).
13. The states are Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington.
14. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MONOGRAPH No. 15, AN-
TITRUST FEDERALISM, THE ROLE OF STATE LAW (1988) [hereinafter ABA MONOGRAPH].
15. EEC Treaty, supra note 3.
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ments, abuses of dominant position, and state aid incompatible
with the common market.
The Treaty of Rome included the achievement of "a system
ensuring that competition in the internal market is not dis-
torted"'16 as one of the fundamental objectives of the Community
and incorporated basic competition rules envisioned as the
means for achieving that objective. Competition was seen as a
way to promote market integration, as well as a goal in itself.
The Treaty of Rome's basic competition rules were set forth in
Articles 85 and 86. The area of competition is one of the few
areas where the Treaty of Rome provided the Commission with
its own powers to implement the law, rather than requiring it to
rely exclusively on the Member States for implementation. The
Community adopted its Merger Regulation 7 in 1989, approxi-
mately thirty years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome and
following many years of negotiation.
Community competition law incorporated strong elements
of subsidiarity from the outset, providing the basis for the juris-
dictional divide between the Community and the Member
States."8 Community rules were intended to create a level play-
ing field for all enterprises throughout the European Union and
to grant only the Commission the tools to review effectively
cross-border arrangements. Community-level rules applicable to
restrictions of competition and abuses of a dominant position
were designed to apply only to situations where an appreciable
effect on trade between the Member States could be established.
In contrast, national rules would apply in situations where the
primary effects were felt in markets within the boundaries of a
single Member State. National competition law would also sup-
port Community law, helping to create a consciousness of the
benefits of competition throughout the European Union. In
merger cases, those transactions which satisfied certain thresh-
old requirements would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Commission, while others would be subject to Member State
control.
16. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 3(g).
17. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 (of 21 December 1989 on the control
of concentrations between undertakings), O.J. L 395 (December 30, 1989) [hereinafter
Merger Regulation].
18. See H. Colin Overbury, Politics or Policy? The Demystification of EC Merger Control,
in 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 558 (Barry Hawk ed., 1993).
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In the years between the entry into force of the Treaty of
Rome in 1957 and the present, each Member State either en-
acted some form of competition law, or modified already ex-
isting laws which had been ineffective, with respect to restric-
tions of competition and abuses of a dominant position. Today,
each of the fifteen Member States has enacted a competition law
in these areas, nine of which substantially resemble those of the
Community, 19 and only four of which are still based on abuse
control."0 Eleven Member States have merger control legisla-
tion.21
II. CURRENT ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURES
A. United States
In the United States, public antitrust enforcement is the re-
sponsibility of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division ("An-
titrust Division"), the Federal Trade Commission Bureau of
Competition ("Bureau of Competition"), and the state attorneys
general. Parallel federal and state court structures buttress their
enforcement efforts.
1. Federal Enforcement
The Antitrust Division and the Bureau of Competition share
responsibility for the enforcement of federal antitrust laws.
These two governmental bodies coordinate their enforcement
efforts to minimize the potential for duplication of effort on any
specific task. In addition, the federal courts have a broad grant
of jurisdiction so that they can hear both federal and, if certain
requirements are met, state antitrust claims.
a. Antitrust Division
The Department of Justice is the nation's principal law en-
forcement body. It is headed by the Attorney General. Serving
under the Attorney General is an Assistant Attorney General who
is in charge of the Antitrust Division. As of 1994, the Antitrust
19. The competition laws of Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Greece, Ireland, Por-
tugal, Spain, and Sweden resemble the competition laws of the Community.
20. The competition laws in Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom are based on abuse control.
21. These Member States are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
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Division consisted of a total of 686 employees, including 323 at-
torneys.22
The Department of Justice is empowered to prosecute viola-
tions of antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act,23 the Clayton
Act,24 and the Robinson Patman Act.2 1 It holds the sole power to
prosecute criminal antitrust violations and all federal antitrust
actions in several sectors, including banking, telecommunica-
tions, and rail and air transportation. The Antitrust Division is
responsible for clarifying its enforcement policies through
guidelines and business review letters, participating in proceed-
ings of regulatory agencies, testifying before Congressional com-
mittees to advocate competition-oriented solutions to national
problems, filing amicus curiae briefs in selected cases, and pro-
moting the notion of competition before professional associa-
tions, business groups, and other organizations.26
b. Bureau of Competition
The Bureau of Competition is primarily responsible for en-
forcing the Federal Trade Commission Act,27 which encom-
passes the antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act, the Clayton
Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act, among others. The Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") may adjudicate complaints that it
initiates after both the prosecution and the defense present evi-
dence in an administrative trial.2 8 The power to adjudicate is
not frequently utilized, however, in antitrust cases.
c. Regional Offices of the Federal Enforcement Agencies
The Antitrust Division has seven field offices throughout
the United States to facilitate enforcement in matters of regional
concern. 29 The field offices perform the Antitrust Division's in-
22. Id.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1994).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21 (1994).
26. Annual Report of the Attorney General 1985, reprinted in Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 8522, at 12,516 [hereinafter Annual Report].
27. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
28. Janet D. Steiger, Effectively Enforcing Competition Laws: Some Aspects of the U.S.
Experience, in 1991 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 1, 17 n.48 (Barry Hawk ed., 1992).
29. Id. at 17. The field offices of the Antitrust division are located in Atlanta,
Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Cleveland, Ohio; Dallas, Texas; New York, New York; Phila-
delphia, Pennsylvania; and San Francisco, California. Id. at 17 n.46.
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vestigatory and litigation functions, within their geographic area
of responsibility. The field offices often work in conjunction
with the offices of the U.S. Attorney, which are also located
throughout the country. They also function as liaisons with state
attorneys general and other regional law enforcement agen-
cies.3" Their workload is primarily focused on criminal enforce-
ment, but they also handle some mergers and civil cases.3"
The FTC maintains ten regional offices.3" The regional of-
fices hold considerable authority to initiate and conduct investi-
gations. They also receive assignments from the FTC's national
headquarters in Washington. Matters initiated by the regional
offices are subject to the same control procedures as those
originating in Washington, i.e., approval of the FTC's national
headquarters is required before formal charges can be brought,
The Antitrust Division's field offices and the FTC's regional
offices facilitate regional enforcement for several reasons. First,
regional offices are more likely to learn of local violations be-
cause they receive complaints, read local newspapers, and ob-
serve the activities of local businesses. Second, it is less costly for
regional offices to investigate local matters, due to savings in
travel expenses and time. Third, regional offices help promote
more direct contact and cooperation with state officials.33 The
Justice Department's field offices play a crucial role in such co-
operation efforts. Its Senior Counsel, responsible for coordina-
tion with the states, meets periodically with the field office chiefs
and the chiefs of the state antitrust divisions in the field offices'
territories.3 4
d. Coordination Between the Federal Agencies
In 1949, the FTC and Antitrust Division initially developed a
liaison mechanism to coordinate their enforcement efforts. This
mechanism has been modified on several occasions over the
30. Annual Report, supra note 26, at 12,521.
31. 60 Minutes with Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Department ofJustice, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 323, 325 (1994) [hereinafter 60 Minutes with
Bingaman].
32. Steiger, supra note 28, at 17. The FTC's regional offices are located in Atlanta,
Georgia; Boston, Massachusetts; Chicago, Illinois; Cleveland, Ohio; Dallas, Texas; Den-
ver, Colorado; Los Angeles, California; New York, New York; San Francisco, California;
and Seattle, Washington. Id. at 17 n.45.
33. Id. at 17.
34. Interview with Milton A. Marquis, supra note 10.
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years. Under this mechanism, a staff member of either agency
wishing to initiate an investigation must contact the liaison office
whose clearance is needed before work begins. If both agencies
indicate an interest in the same matter, the liaison officer must
assign the matter to the agency which has greater expertise in
the subject.35 This mechanism has functioned well to prevent
duplication of effort, as the two agencies have never considered
the same transaction at the same time.3 6
In recent years, the two agencies have made further efforts
to coordinate their activities. One important step has been the
issuance of joint guidelines to which both agencies subscribe.37
The two agencies also announced that they will undertake new
measures to streamline the pre-merger review required under
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976
("HSR") .8
e. Federal Courts
In addition to the federal enforcement agencies, federal
courts play a vital role in the enforcement of federal antitrust
law, as they have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate claims
under those laws. The federal court system consists of the Fed-
eral District Courts, twelve Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the
U.S. Supreme Court. Each circuit court has its own precedent
interpreting the broadly drafted antitrust statutes. In the ab-
sence of a Supreme Court decision, federal circuit courts are
bound only by precedent within their circuit. Review by the
Supreme Court is essentially discretionary, resulting in many cir-
cuit conflicts which persist for years or are never resolved.
35. Steiger, supra note 28, at 22.
36. Roundtable Discussion with Enforcement Officials, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 951, 969
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 Roundtable Discussion].
37. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104; U.S. Dep't ofJustice
and Federal Trade Comm'n Antitrust Enforcement Policy Statements in the Health
Care Area (1993), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,151; U.S. Dep't ofJustice
and Federal Trade Comm'n Statements of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Princi-
ples Relating to Health Care and Antitrust (1994), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,152; U.S. Dep't of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,107; U.S. Dep't of Justice and Federal Trade Comm'n Antitrust Guidelines for Li-
censing of Intellectual Property (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,132.
38. National Ass'n of Attorneys General, 22 ANTITRUST REP., March/April 1995, at
14; see Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383.
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Federal courts may have jurisdiction to decide state antitrust
claims originally filed in state court if the defendant removes the
case to federal court. Federal law allows the removal of "[a] ny
civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, trea-
ties or laws of the United States."39 Under this provision, "pen-
dent" state claims, which are claims made under state antitrust
law arising out of the same facts or circumstances as federal
claims, may be removed to federal court along with federal law
claims.40
2. State Enforcement
State enforcement of antitrust laws is carried out by state
attorneys general and state courts. Similar to the cooperation
between the Antitrust Division and the FTC, the state attorneys
general coordinate their respective efforts through the NAAG.
In addition, the NAAG exchanges information regarding investi-
gations with representatives from the FTC and the Assistant At-
torney General for Antitrust.
a. Enforcement by State Attorneys General
The office of the Attorney General4' of each of the fifty
states has the power to enforce both federal and state antitrust
laws. When a state investigates possible antitrust violations, state
laws are usually relied upon and typically provide the attorney
general with the power to subpoena documents and witnesses
prior to the filing of an action. State statutes provide various
remedies, including monetary damages, penalties, injunctions,
revocation of corporate charters, and, in some cases, criminal
fines and imprisonment.42 Some states empower attorneys gen-
eral to bring criminal actions based on state law for antitrust vio-
lations.43 As of 1994, approximately twelve states actively utilized
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994).
40. Pueblo Int'l, Inc. v. De Cardona, 725 F.2d 823 (1st Cir. 1984).
41. In 43 states, the Attorney General is popularly elected. In the remaining seven
states, he or she is appointed, selected by secret ballot of the legislature or the state
supreme court, or appointed by the state's chief executive. Milliken & Myers, supra
note 12, at 2.
42. Id. at 4. State Attorneys General may exercise all authority required to protect
the public interest, unless the state legislature has deprived the Attorney General of
specific powers. Florida v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976).
43. 60 Minutes with Laurel A. Price, Chair, National Association of Attorneys General
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criminal enforcement authority." The criminal laws of each
state vary significantly with regard to the types of related offenses
which may be charged in conjunction with an antitrust bid-rig-
ging charge.45
Statutory or case law in many states is stricter than federal
law. The U.S. Constitution and Congress permit this federalist
disharmony because the states have concurrent jurisdiction over
antitrust matters affecting interstate commerce.46 Moreover,
although federal law could preempt state laws under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, either through express
statement by Congress or to the extent that the two conflict, this
has rarely occurred in the antitrust field.47
Because few state judges are familiar with antitrust law, how-
ever, most state antitrust enforcers choose to file lawsuits in fed-
eral court and assert state antitrust claims as pendent claims.48
There are generally three methods by which a state can assert
state antitrust claims in federal court. First, a state has standing
to sue under federal law as a private party, for damages or in-
junction, where the state itself has been injured as a purchaser of
the goods or services which are the subject of the antitrust viola-
tion.49 A state may also bring an action as parens patriae, on be-
half of natural persons who are citizens of the state and who
have been injured as a result of a violation of the Sherman Act,50
under sections 4 and 16 of the HSR.51 Under the Supreme
Multistate Antitrust Task Force, 63 ANTITRUST LJ. 303, 305 (1994) [hereinafter 60 Minutes
with Price].
44. Id. at 318.
45. Id.
46. ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 14, at 9-11.
47. See Barry E. Hawk & James D. Veltrop, Dual Antitrust Enforcement in the United
States: Positive or Negative Lessons for the European Community, in PROCEDURE AND ENFORCE-
MENT IN E.C. AND U.S. COMPETITION LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEIDEN EUROPA IN-
STITUUT SEMINAR ON USER-FRIENDLY COMPETITION LAW 30 (Piet Jan Slot & Alison Mc-
Donnell eds., 1993).
48. Interview with Milton A. Marquis, supra note 10; see Milliken & Myers, supra
note 12, at 5. Section 4(c) of the Clayton Act empowers states to enforce federal anti-
trust law. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (1994).
49. See Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, 26 (1994). A state may
not bring an action for damages to the general economy of the state, but it may sue for
injunctive relief to cure violations which damage the general economy of the state.
Milliken & Myers, supra note 12, at 6. States may seek divestiture in merger cases under
federal law. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
50. A state, however, is not permitted to bring such a claim in merger cases.
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1994).
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Court's ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,5" however, the citi-
zens on behalf of whom such an action is filed cannot be indi-
rect purchasers of the product from the defendant.5" Second,
state attorneys general acting collectively can bring a multistate
action in federal court. Third, an attorney general can bring an
action simultaneously with a federal agency in federal court.
b. Coordination among Attorneys General: NAAG
The NAAG, a trade association of attorneys general, was es-
tablished in 1907 to promote communication among the chief
law enforcement officers of each state and to assist in the deliv-
ery of high quality legal services to the states. Its activities in-
clude interstate cooperation on legal and law enforcement is-
sues, policy research, and analysis. Enforcement activities are
engaged in under the umbrella of the NAAG, but are, in fact, ad
hoc enforcement decisions by particular attorneys general,
either individually or collectively. The NAAG itself, however, has
no authority to make such enforcement decisions.54 In addition,
the NAAG's coordination efforts among the states have included
issuance of joint vertical restraints guidelines,55 creation of a
computer network among the state antitrust offices to coordi-
nate litigation efforts, 56 and guidance to the business community
through statements of general enforcement policy.
The NAAG Antitrust Committee is composed of nine attor-
neys general, who study substantive antitrust matters and recom-
mend policy positions to the attorneys general. These positions
are often the basis for testimony by attorneys general at Congres-
52. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
53. Approximately 20 states have enacted statutes known as "Illinois Brick repeal-
ers." These statutes provide that indirect purchasers may recover for violations of the
state antitrust law where overcharges were passed on to them by the direct purchasers.
The Supreme Court upheld the legality of such statutes in California v. ARC America
Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989). This decision emboldened states to pass such statutes, and
many more are expected to do so. 60 Minutes with Robert M. Langer Chair, National
Association of Attorneys General Multistate Task Force, 61 ANTITRUST LJ. 211, 216 (1992)
[hereinafter 60 Minutes with Langer].
54. 1995 Roundtable Discussion, supra note 36, at 980.
55. The guidelines do not bind individual attorneys general, who may vary or sup-
plement the guidelines in their individual prosecutorial discretion. National Ass'n of
Attorneys General, 22 ANTITRUST REP., March 1995, at 3.
56. This allows instantaneous circulation of drafts and documents, and eliminates
the need for significant amounts of travel that would otherwise be necessary to coordi-
nate prosecution of a single matter. 1995 Roundtable Discussion, supra note 36, at 963.
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sional hearings or in letters to Congress. The NAAG's Antitrust
Task Force, composed of the principal antitrust attorneys from
all fifty states, coordinates proposed joint antitrust actions
among the states.57 It functions as a loose confederation and the
extent to which the states act in relative uniformity is "a tribute
to the trust that state attorneys general have in the Task Force as
an institution .... I' The Multistate Task Force, a staff-level
group involving each state and territory, meets twice a year to
coordinate matters of regional interest. It pursues multistate
cases and submits amicus curiae briefs in cases before the U.S.
Supreme Court.
59
In addition, an Executive Working Group on Antitrust, con-
sisting of the five Commissioners of the FTC, the Assistant Attor-
ney General for Antitrust, and five representatives of the NAAG,
was established in 1989 to serve as a forum for exchanging infor-
mation about investigations, discussing potential cooperative ef-
forts, sharing resources, and developing stronger working rela-
tionships. The group meets two or three times per year to con-
sult and coordinate antitrust enforcement initiatives.6" For
example, one plan for the group is to have staff-level working
groups in areas of joint federal-state interest.61
c. State Courts
Each state has its own court system, which may include a
trial court, an appellate court, and a supreme court. State courts
adjudicate antitrust claims based on state law, but are not em-
powered to adjudicate federal antitrust claims.6 1 Because state
courts are inexperienced in adjudicating state antitrust claims,
however, parties often file state antitrust claims in federal court.
57. Steiger, supra note 28, at 19-20.
58. 60 Minutes with Langer, supra note 53, at 214.
59. See, e.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (debating issue of level
of state supervision necessary to confer "state action" immunity on private parties).
60. 60 Minutes with Price, supra note 43, at 305 n.3.
61. Id. at 305 n.4.
62. See General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 271 (1922)
(holding that right to sue under Sherman Antitrust Act "is to be exercised only in a
'court of the United States.' This suit was brought in a state court, and in so far as its
purpose was to enjoin a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act that court could not
entertain it." (citation omitted)).
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B. European Union
The Commission and the competition authorities of the
Member States enforce competition laws in the European
Union. The courts of the Community, as well as the national
courts of the Member States, are responsible for reviewing the
decisions of the authorities. Likewise, the Member States dele-
gate enforcement of the competition laws to a central body, the
national competition authority. The decisions of the authority
are, in turn, reviewable by one or more national tribunals.
1. Community Enforcement
Enforcement of Community competition laws is shared be-
tween the Commission and the Community Courts. The Com-
mission's competition department prepares cases and renders fi-
nal decisions on claims. The Community Courts can then review
the Commission's decision.
a. The Commission
The Treaty of Rome supplied the Commission with in-
dependent powers to ensure the application of the competition
laws, including Articles 85, 86, and the Merger Regulation. 63 All
final decisions in competition cases are reached through a vote
of the Commission.64 Thus, the twenty Commissioners are the
ultimate decision-makers in competition cases.6 5 Their deci-
sions, however, are reviewable by the Court of First Instance and
the Court of Justice.
Directorate General IV ("DG IV"), the Commission's com-
petition department, prepares cases based on notifications, com-
plaints, or other means of learning of potential violations. DG
IV is subdivided into seven directorates, each of which is headed
by a Director. The staff of DG IV consists of 420 "functionnaires"
63. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 89.
64. Merger Regulation, supra note 17; First Reg. implementing arts. 85 and 86,
1959-62 O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 87, amended by Reg. No. 59, 1959-62 O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 249;
Reg. No. 118/63/EEC, 1963-64 O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 55; and Reg. No. 2822/71, 1971 O.J.
Eng. Spec. Ed. (III) 1035 [hereinafter Regulation 17].
65. Commissioners are appointed by their national governments for five-year re-
newable terms during which they cannot be dismissed. EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts.
157, 158. In making the appointments, the national governments consider both inter-
nal political concerns and acceptability to the other Member State governments. T.C.
HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 9 (2d ed. 1988).
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located in Brussels. Of these 420, fifty percent are professionals,
mainly lawyers and economists, and of that fifty percent, approx-
imately half work on traditional antitrust matters6 while the
other half works on matters related to State Aid and Article 90.67
An additional twenty-five professionals work with DG IV on tem-
porary secondment from the competition authorities of the
Member States. DG IV also consists of "rapporteurs,"68 lawyers
and economists who work on traditional antitrust matters.
Although the number of rapporteurs was increased in 1989 with
the establishment of the Merger Task Force, there has been little
increase since then. Furthermore, the number of rapporteurs is
unlikely to increase significantly, at least in the short term, due
to budgetary constraints. Despite this fact, there will be some
limited increase from the accession of new Member States.
Although the staff size of DG IV has remained stable, its
workload has increased steadily. The number of new Article 85
and 86 cases increased from 293 in 1981 to 399 in 1992.69 It also
has a backlog of unresolved cases under these articles which
numbered 1231 at the end of 1993.70
b. The Community Courts
The Court of First Instance's jurisdiction to review competi-
tion decisions of the Commission is unlimited. It may cancel,
reduce, or increase fines or penalties that the Commission im-
poses. The Court ofJustice, in turn, may review decisions of the
Court of First Instance.71
66. This includes Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty and the Merger Regulation.
67. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 90 at 50. Article 90 discusses the competition
rules that apply to public enterprises in the EU Member States. Id.
68. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1989). A rapporteur is "[a] person who
prepares an account of the proceedings of a committee, etc. for a higher body." Id.
69. House of Lords Select Comm. on the European Communities, Enforcement of
Community Competition Rules: Report with Evidence, Session 1993-94, 1st Report
(London 1993), Ehlermann testimony, at 110 [hereinafter Lords Report].
70. Id.
71. Regulation 17, supra note 64, art. 17; Merger Regulation, supra note 17, art. 16;
TEU, supra note 1, arts. 168(a), 173; Council Decision of 24 October 1988 establishing
a Court of First Instance of the European Communities, OJ. L 319/1 (1988). The
Court of First Instance was created in 1989 to ease the workload of the Court ofJustice.
T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 63 (3d ed. 1994). The
Court of Justice delegates to the Court of First Instance cases having little political or
constitutional importance. Id. To ensure that the Court of First Instance stayed in line,
a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law is granted. Id.
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2. Member State Enforcement
Each of the Member States has a national competition au-
thority designed to enforce its competition laws. The power of
the national authority to enforce Community competition law
varies, however, from state-to-state depending upon whether the
specific Member State has adopted necessary enabling legisla-
tion. The Member States courts may apply Community law if
private parties file the case. The current legal structure provides
little reason for a national authority to raise claims under Com-
munity law.
a. National Authority Enforcement
The national competition authorities of the Member States
have the power to investigate, make decisions, and impose sanc-
tions. Their power, however, depends upon their degree of au-
tonomy from political influence in executing these powers. Ad-
ministrative decisions of the competition authorities are univer-
sally subject to review by a national tribunal of competent
jurisdiction.
The investigatory powers of the Member States are generally
more extensive than those of the Commission in two important
respects: many of them may direct their investigatory efforts
against individuals and sanction them for failure to cooperate,
including imprisonment for failure to obey a court order. They
also have police powers, including the possibility to obtain
search warrants, which they may use to support their efforts to
make on-site inspections.72 In contrast, the Commission may not
direct its investigatory efforts against individuals or sanction
them, nor does it have police powers. It may impose monetary
sanctions on undertakings for failure to cooperate, and it may
request the assistance of Member State authorities to complete
an investigation. In addition, three Member States 73 provide
72. LARAINE L. LAUDATI, SURVEYS OF THE MEMBER STATES' POWER TO INVESTIGATE
AND SANCTION VIOLATIONS OF NATIONAL COMPETITION LAWS 6 (1995).
73. These three Member States are Austria, France, and the Netherlands. In Aus-
tria, imprisonment and/or criminal fines may be imposed against "members of a cartel,
organ, or tacit agent of a cartel or cartel member." All "entrepreneurs" of a cartel are
to be held liable for fines jointly with the convicted person. Kartellgesetznovelle, §§ 129,
136 (1993). In France, criminal penalties may be imposed against individuals whose
acts were crucial to the conception, organization, and implementation of prohibited
practices. Ordonnance du 1 Decembre 1986, art. 17. In the Netherlands, violation of a
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criminal sanctions for restrictive practices and abuses of a domi-
nant position. Member state laws, however, may not be applied
if they conflict with Community law regarding cross-border
trade. 4
Article 88 of the Treaty of Rome empowers Member State
competition authorities to apply Community competition law.
Moreover, under the doctrine of direct effect,75 Member State
courts are empowered to adjudicate actions by private parties
based on violations of Community competition law.76 However,
this authority is limited. Courts may prohibit restrictive practices
and abuses of a dominant position, pursuant to Articles 85(1)
and 86, only if the Commission has not opened procedures cov-
ering the same offenses. 77 Member State courts, however, may
not grant exemptions for restrictive practices that meet the re-
quirement set forth in Article 85 (3). Instead, only the Commis-
sion can grant Article 85(3) exemptions.7" National enabling
legislation is required to allow national authorities to apply Arti-
cles 85 and 86 and to establish that national remedies apply.
Seven Member States have adopted such enabling legislation,79
Royal Decree prohibiting or obliging certain conduct after the Minister of Economic
Affairs has found a dominant position to be contrary to the general interest is subject to
criminal penalties. LAUDATi, supra note 72, at 71-73.
74. Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, Case No. 14/68, [1969] E.C.R. 1, [1969] 8
C.M.L.R. 100.
75. Under the doctrine of direct effect, Community law imposes obligations and
confers rights directly on the rationales of the Member States of the EU. The Court of
Justice held:
[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States, but
also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Com-
munity law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also
intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heri-
tage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the ,
Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly
defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the
institutions of the Community.
Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlandse Administratie der Belastingen, Case No. 26/62,
[1963] E.C.R. 1, 12, [1963] 2 C.M.L.R. 105.
76. Id.
77. See Regulation 17, supra note 66, art. 9.
78. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 85(3) at 627; Regulation 17 supra note 66, art. 9.
Once a "block exemption" to Article 85(1) has been established by regulation, it is
directly applicable. Thus, national authorities may rely upon it.
79. These Member States include Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Greece,
and Portugal.
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while eight have not.80 Remedies vary considerably among the
Member States based on deeply rooted historical differences and
cultural attitudes.8" Thus, the rights of parties vary depending
on the remedies offered by the Member State in which the ac-
tion is brought.
Currently, in areas where Community law and national law
coincide, there is little benefit for a national authority to raise
claims under Community law. National provisions can often be
applied faster and to greater effect.8 2 The remedies are often
the same for both and are those provided by national legislation.
Only the Commission can apply fines under the Community's
provisions. Community law only provides an advantage when it
prohibits acts which national law does not prohibit.8"
National authorities are skeptical about initiating proceed-
ings under Article 85(1) because they fear the Commission's
power to terminate those proceedings by filing its own action.84
Moreover, they fear they will waste time and resources if the
Commission can grant an exemption under Article 85(3) after
they have found a violation under Article 85(1).85
b. Member State Courts
In most Member States, the national competition authority
is empowered to issue administrative decisions with respect to
competition cases applying Member State law. National compe-
tition authorities also may apply Community law, subject to the
aforementioned limitations. Such decisions are reviewable by
one or more national tribunals. In addition, Member State
courts are empowered to apply Community competition law in
cases filed by private parties.
80. These nations are Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
81. Lords Report, supra note 69, Ehlermann testimony, at 132.
82. H. Peter Von Stoephasius, Enforcement of EC Competition Law by National Authori-
ties, in PROCEDURE AND ENFORCEMENT IN E.C. AND U.S. COMPETITION LAW: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE LEIDEN EUROPA INSTITUUT SEMINAR ON USER-FRIENDLY COMPETITION LAW 33 (Piet
Jan Slot & Alison McDonnell eds., 1993).
83. See Rainer Bechtold, Antitrust Law in the European Community and Germany - An
Uncoordinated Co-Existence?, in 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. (Barry Hawk ed., 1993);
Joachim Zekoll, European Community Competition Law and National Competition Laws: Com-
patibility Problems from a German Perspective, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (1991).
84. Von Stoephasius, supra note 82, at 34.
85. Id.
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III. COOPERATION BY ANTITRUST ENFORCERS AT
DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
The desired end in both the European Union and in the
United States is maximizing the use of enforcement resources
and obtaining consistent results in the enforcement of similar
laws. Each has taken different approaches towards the coordina-
tion of the efforts of their central and state authorities. In the
United States, coordination has been the result of efforts by both
the federal agencies and the states. In contrast, in the European
Union, the efforts are driven by the Commission's need to de-
crease its unwieldy workload.
A. United States
In the United States, considerable efforts have been made
to improve cooperation and coordination between federal and
state antitrust enforcers. As discussed above, during the Reagan
era of antitrust non-enforcement at the federal level, the states
became active in their own enforcement activities and began to
coordinate their activities through the NAAG. Thereafter, when
federal enforcement was reactivated, the federal agencies were
confronted with the need to coordinate their activities with their
state counterparts. The states have not indicated whether they
will relinquish the aggressive enforcement posture they devel-
oped. Aware of the potential benefits in terms of extending en-
forcement resources, Antitrust Division Chief James Rill and
FTC Chairman Janet Steiger, working with individual states and
with the NAAG, took the initiative to expand and improve coor-
dination of federal and state enforcement 86 and to engage in
joint enforcement.8 7 Although such efforts to coordinate their
86. Laurel A. Price, Chair of the NAAG, explained:
When I started doing this some years ago, federal-state cooperation really
amounted to various agencies of the United States sending people to state
meetings and telling us what they could do for us. We literally understood
that to mean, "If you have a good case, send it to us and we'll do something
with it." We subsequently came to understand federal-state cooperation to
mean, "If you have a good case, send it to us and we'll dismiss it." We have
now come to understand federal-state cooperation to mean, "If you have a
good case, let's come together and do it right."
Laurel A. Price, Chair, Remarks at the Roundtable Discussion with Enforcement Officials, Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General, Multistate Antitrust Task Force, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 951,
965-66 (1995).
87. 60 Minutes with Bingaman, supra note 31, at 329.
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activities have continued and grown, merger control by states of
transactions extending beyond a state's borders has been widely
debated and is controversial because it raises difficult enforce-
ment issues not raised in non-merger cases.""
Currently, coordination is recognized to promote efficient
use of scarce antitrust law enforcement resources and to improve
consistency in the application of the federal and various state
antitrust laws to the benefit of the business community. These
efforts have taken many forms.
First, on several occasions in recent years where both fed-
eral and state enforcers have had an interest, they have initiated
joint investigations, 9 joint actions, 90 and entered joint settle-
ments. In the past year, the Department of Justice and the states
have jointly investigated thirty matters, five of which resulted in
joint consent decrees and ten of which are still pending.9' This
has occurred primarily in cases involving mergers, horizontal
price fixing, and resale price mechanisms ("RPM"). On occa-
sion, cooperation efforts have involved cross-deputization,
through which federal or state enforcement officials have been
authorized to act in the other's enforcement jurisdiction as its
agent.92 Federal officials have benefited from state officials'
deep knowledge of their local communities to detect violations
because it would be virtually impossible for federal agencies to
88. Federal and state governments disagree as to the substantive standards which
should be applied to mergers. These differences are apparent from comparing the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(1992) reprinted in, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, with Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines of the National Association of Attorneys general (1993) reprinted in, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. 13,406. For instance, the two sets of guidelines apply different presumptions
concerning the likelihood of anticompetitive impact upon the same levels of market
concentration. See James P. Rill & Christine S. Chambers, ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE
ANNUAL ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Laraine Laudati
eds., forthcoming 1997).
89. Joint investigations would be possible in the European Union. In fact, Article
14 of Regulation 17, Regulation 17, supra note 64, art. 14, 1959-62 OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed.
91, provides that national authorities may assist the Commission in carrying out an in-
vestigation and must assist when an undertaking opposes an investigation.
90. Joint filings would not be possible in the European Union because the Com-
munity has no power to enforce national law and, once the Commission initiates pro-
ceedings in a matter, national authorities would have no power to enforce Community
law. Cooperation in parallel proceedings would be possible, but until now, has been
virtually non-existent.
91. Interview with Milton A. Marquis, supra note 10.
92. Milliken and Myers, supra note 12, at 12.
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monitor compliance of firms with the antitrust laws in a country
as large as the United States. 93 In turn, federal officials have as-
sisted the states in their enforcement efforts, particularly by pro-
viding the expertise of economists, the resource the states lack
most.94 Complex market definition and market power issues,
often requiring many witnesses, would be difficult for a state to
handle on its own. 9 5 These efforts have improved the consis-
tency of the law's enforcement and have created partnerships
between federal and state officials. The following are some ex-
amples of the most significant joint actions:
* In 1995, the Department of Justice and the state of Penn-
sylvania jointly investigated, then filed parallel settlements
with Playmobil toy company for violations involving RPM.96
* In 1994, the FTC and all fifty states jointly settled one case
involving price fixing in the athletic footwear market in vio-
lation of federal and state law against Reebock9 7 and a sec-
ond case involving a resale price maintenance scheme in-
volving Keds in the women's casual footwear market.98
* In 1994, the Antitrust Division and the Florida Attorney
General jointly investigated and filed the first joint com-
plaint in the Morton Plant/Meese Hospital merger. 99 A
second joint action in a merger case between the Antitrust
Division and the states of Maryland and Florida occurred in
the BFI/Atwood case.1 00
* In 1994, the Antitrust Division and the state of Utah coordi-
nated their prosecutions regarding price fixing by hospitals
of their compensation levels for nurses. Utah completed its
portion of the matter in state court at the same time that
the Division's consent decrees were filed in federal court.
It was the first example of the Antitrust Division deferring a
93. For instance, states are closer to health care markets than the Federal Govern-
ment. The knowledge and expertise of state regulators regarding health care markets
exceeds that of federal regulators. 60 Minutes with Bingaman, supra note 31, at 330-31.
94. 1995 Roundtable Discussion, supra note 36, at 968.
95. Remarks of Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US.
Department of Justice, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 951, 968 (1995) [hereinafter Remarks of Bin-
gaman].
96. National Ass'n of Attorneys General, 22 ANTITRUST REPORT, May/June 1995, at
18-19.
97. Id. at 1-2.
98. Keds Corp., No. C-3490, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 23,463 (Apr. 1, 1994).
99. United States v. Morton Plant Health Sys., Inc., No. 94-748-CIV-T-23E, 1994
WL 655199, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 1994).
100. 1995 Roundtable Discussion, supra note 36, at 978.
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portion of the resolution of a matter to a state, thus, en-
couraging active state enforcement. 10'
* In 1993, forty-five states and the District of Columbia filed
suit jointly regarding program distribution practices in the
cable industry. The five-year multistate investigation and
filing of the suit were coordinated with the Antitrust Divi-
sion. Consent decrees were filed simultaneously by the An-
titrust Division in federal court.
* The FTC and the states reached a simultaneous resolution
in the Nintendo case.1 0 2
As of 1995, the Antitrust Division had twelve ongoing civil inves-
tigations with state attorneys general and four criminal investiga-
tions. 113
Second, efforts have been made to increase information
sharing between federal and state agencies. In the area of
merger enforcement, where state enforcement has been chal-
lenged as inappropriate based on the unique timing, financial,
and interstate commerce interests associated with mergers, the
need for coordination was especially acute. In 1988, forty-five
states executed the NAAG Voluntary Pre-Merger Disclosure
Compact ("Compact"). It was designed to provide an incentive
for merging parties to voluntarily provide the states with copies
of their HSR filings and other materials which they provide to
federal agencies.1"4 In return, states would waive the right to
utilize compulsory process to seek information regarding the
transaction prior to the termination of the HSR review process.
The Compact was utilized little until the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that states have the right to obtain divestiture as a
remedy in a merger case under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.105
Thereafter, the members of the NAAG's Executive Working
Group for Antitrust developed an Information Sharing Protocol
("Protocol")10 6 under which the states could obtain access to
HSR filings with the consent of the merging parties.1 0 7 The fed-
101. 60 Minutes with Price, supra note 43, at 306.
102. 60 Minutes with Langer, supra note 53, at 215.
103. Remarks of Bingaman, sulpra note 95, at 957.
104. The Compact was revised subsequently to permit states to request supplemen-
tal materials. 60 Minutes with Price, supra note 43, at 309-310.
105. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 271 (1990).
106. 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 338 (Mar. 12, 1992).
107. 60 Minutes with Langer, supra note 53, at 214-15.
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eral agencies implemented the Protocol.108 NAAG representa-
tives believed that the underutilized compact would become
more popular due to the Protocol because the Protocol would
increase business' awareness that it is in their interest to comply
voluntarily.
Thereafter, the FTC ruled that states were no longer enti-
tled to access materials which had not been filed in conjunction
with a Hart-Scott-Rodino merger notification relating to mergers
from its files under the traditional provisions of Section 6(f) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, as the protocol was intended
to provide the exclusive means by which the states could obtain
information from the Commission. The NAAG disagreed with
this interpretation. 10 9
In 1995, the FTC and the Department of Justice announced
a new policy to increase the sharing of information regarding
mergers. It provided that states may receive information ob-
tained from third parties, without revealing their identity, and
staff analytic memoranda after the FTC has decided whether it
will challenge the merger. 110 The Compact and the Protocol are
expected to diminish the risk of inconsistent enforcement by the
states and federal Government by permitting communication
and coordination of state and federal antitrust enforcers at the
earliest stages of an investigation.111
Third, federal and state agencies have referred complaints
and investigation leads to their state or federal counterparts.
For instance, the FTC has referred some matters in the health
care field and the real estate listing field to the states. In turn,
the states have referred cases which they did not have the re-
sources to handle or that are more appropriately handled at the
federal level.1 12
Fourth, new institutional structures have been created to
promote federal-state coordination, such as the NAAG Executive
108. Program for Federal-State Cooperation in Merger Enforcement, 57 Fed. Reg.
8127 (1992), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,212.
109. 60 Minutes with Bingaman, supra note 31, at 339-40.
110. FTC News, Press Release, 21.6.95; National Ass'n of Attorneys General, 22
ANTITRUST REPORT, May/June 1995, at 2-3.
111. 60 Minutes with Langer, supra note 53, at 215.
112. 60 Minutes with the Honorable Janet D. Steiger, Chairman, Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 61 ANTITRUST LJ. 187, 205 (1992) [hereinafter 60 Minutes with Steiger].
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Working Group for Antitrust.11 In 1994, the Antitrust Division
appointed Milton A. Marquis to be Senior Counsel to the Assis-
tant Attorney General. As such, Milton A. Marquis served as a
liaison with state authorities in hopes of increasing communica-
tion and understanding between the Division and the states.11 4
Marquis has worked extensively with the NAAG Antitrust Task
Force to coordinate federal and state enforcement efforts, as
well as with individual state attorney general's offices.
Fifth, the states have submitted briefs as amicus curiae in
support of the federal government's position in cases. Sixth,
conferences are held regularly in which state enforcers meet
with federal enforcers, during which they discuss a broad range
of antitrust issues. They also hold joint training programs in a
number of specific areas, including health care, telecommunica-
tions, cross-examination of experts, and the use of demonstrative
evidence.' 1
5
Seventh, Assistant Attorney General Bingaman proposed
that the states should have a right of first refusal for the criminal
prosecution of matters of primarily local interest.1 16 Accord-
ingly, states would have the right to prosecute violations of anti-
trust laws having primarily local impact, such as localized bid-
rigging and price fixing in local markets." 7 This proposal is cur-
rently being discussed. The comparative advantages of federal
and state laws will be prime considerations in making case-by-
case determinations. Finally, the federal agencies have provided
the states with the opportunity to review and comment on their
health care guidelines while in their formative stages.11
In addition to coordinating efforts directly with federal en-
forcers, states have taken the initiative to express their views di-
rectly to Congress regarding federal antitrust legislation initia-
tives. For instance, twenty-four attorneys general submitted a let-
ter to Congress regarding legislation seeking to deregulate the
telecommunications industry.1 9 They requested that Congress
113. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
114. Antitrust Division Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1994, at 23.
115. Remarks of Bingaman, supra note 95, at 957.
116. Id.
117. 60 Minutes with Price, supra note 43, at 305.
118. Id. at 306-07.
119. National Ass'n of Attorneys General, 22 ANTITRUST REPORT, May/June 1995,
at 3-4.
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incorporate "basic antitrust principles and recognize the essen-
tial role of the states in ensuring that citizens have universal and
affordable access to the telecommunications network."'
Both federal and state enforcers recognize that they will not
always reach agreement with respect to matters of mutual inter-
est. However, they do not view this as inconsistent with or detri-
mental to their efforts at coordination. Several examples of ar-
eas where disagreement has occurred follow:
* The most dramatic example pertains to enforcement policy
with respect to vertical restraints. In the early 1980's, dur-
ing the Reagan years, the Department of Justice did not
challenge vertical restraints. In January 1985, the Depart-
ment of Justice issued its vertical restraints guidelines,
which expressed a policy of leniency with respect to such
restraints. These guidelines were strongly criticized by
many parties, including Congress. They were not adopted
by the FTC and they were largely ignored by the federal
judiciary. The NAAG opposed the policy expressed in the
guidelines, and viewed it as "a 'political' document,
designed to move the law in a particular direction." '2 In
December 1985, the NAAG issued its own vertical restraints
guidelines, which it revised in 1987, in an attempt to state
the law as the NAAG understood it at the time.1 22 The
NAAG guidelines announced a much stronger enforce-
ment position against vertical restraints.
Thereafter, the NAAG sought the withdrawal of the fed-
eral vertical restraints guidelines. This was realized in 1993
with an announcement to that effect by Bingaman, fol-
lowed by an increase in enforcement efforts against vertical
restraints by federal enforcers. In response, the NAAG es-
tablished a working group to revise its vertical restraints
guidelines, at least to decrease the rhetorical level. 123 On
March 27, 1995, a plenary session of the attorneys general
approved the revised guidelines. 124
120. Id.
121. National Association of Attorneys General, 22 ANTITRUST REPORT, March/
April 1995, at 8.
122. Id.
123. 60 Minutes with Price, supra note 43, at 306.
124. National Ass'n of Attorneys General, 22 ANTITRUST REPORT, March/April
1995, at 2. The major modification was a "market power screen," such that if the re-
straint occurs in a market where none of the parties have more than 10% of the rele-
vant market it is extremely unlikely that the restraint will be challenged by an attorney
general.
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The revised guidelines do not mention the Justice De-
partment guidelines as references to the guidelines present
in the NAAG's earlier versions have been removed. The
NAAG asserts, "the [NAAG] Guidelines are a significant re-
affirmation of the primacy of the role of the states in the
area of vertical restraints and will serve as a constant re-
minder that any risk assessment involves consideration of
how a particular state Attorney General will evaluate the
matter."
125
* The NAAG submitted comments regarding the Depart-
ment of Justice/FTC Joint Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
some of which were accepted regarding merger analysis.12 6
The NAAG thereafter revised its own Horizontal Merger
Guidelines,127 in order to maximize harmonization with
the federal guidelines. With respect to the merger com-
pact and protocol, FTC Chairman Steiger stated that coop-
eration between the FTC and the NAAG was not depen-
dent upon the degree to which the NAAG followed the new
Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued jointly by the two fed-
eral agencies.128 She noted:
as the compact is invoked and used, it may be an impor-
tant tool for increasing convergence in merger analysis,
particularly important now with the new Guidelines. If
we do assist the states in their merger analysis, and they
are able to observe our analysis, I think over time what
we are doing will become more understandable. In turn,
that, I believe, will lead us to greater convergence in how
we go about our work.'2 9
* In the states' amicus curiae brief program, federal and state
disagreement is frequently evident. For instance, in Image
Technical Services Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 130 twenty-nine
states filed an amicus brief taking a position regarding mar-
ket power at odds with the Federal Government's position.
Several states also filed an amicus brief taking a position
different from both the federal position and the position
taken in another amicus brief filed by a different group of
125. Id. at 4.
126. 60 Minutes with Langer, supra note 53, at 219.
127. National Ass'n of Attorneys General, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (March
30, 1993), reprinted in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1608, Special Supple-
ment (Apr. 1, 1993).
128. 60 Minutes with Steiger, supra note 112, at 205.
129. Id.
130. 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), affd, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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states, in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co."5' States' amicus
briefs which take positions differing from the federal posi-
tion have also been filed in the areas of vertical restraints
and the state action immunity doctrine. 1 2 Federal-state
disagreement is evident not only in the enforcement poli-
cies of the agencies, but also in the states' reactions to fed-
eral court decisions, such as the Illinois Brick decision.' 3 3
B. European Union
The coordination and cooperation efforts which have been
made in the United States in recent years have no parallel in the
European Union. Instead, the relationship between the Com-
mission and Member State enforcement authorities is focused
on the Commission's recent efforts to "decentralize" enforce-
ment of Community competition law. The long-term goal of the
project is to have one Community competition statute applied
throughout the Community by a network of DG IV, national
competition authorities, and national courts. Each Member
State would also be free to impose additional requirements for
purely local phenomena. Although this decentralization effort is
partially motivated by the subsidiarity principle, the main motiva-
tion is to expand the resources utilized to enforce Community
rules, given DG IV's limited resources and extensive caseload re-
sulting from its notification system. The Commission believes
that the national authorities could greatly expand the detection
and prosecution of violations of Articles 85(1) and 86 affecting
markets within their jurisdiction.
An essential aspect of the Commission's decentralization ef-
fort is its belief that it, and the Member States, should apply the
same competition rules to increase legal certainty for companies,
create a level playing field, and eliminate forum shopping.
Moreover, the Commission believes that multiple controls at the
Community and Member State levels for the same conduct
should be eliminated because they waste enforcement resources,
risk divergent decisions, and unjustifiably raise costs to compa-
nies. Thus, the Commission urges that either it should exercise
control on its own or a Member State authority should exercise
131. 922 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
132. 60 Minutes with Langer, supra note 53, at 212.
133. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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control. Both should refrain from sharing control unless the cir-
cumstances merit joint prosecution.
Some Member States, such as Germany, have argued that
national authorities should have the power to grant Article 85(3)
exemptions, tempered by appropriate procedures, so as to deter-
mine competence and ensure uniform application of the law.13 4
DG IV is not willing, however, to share its authority for the grant-
ing of exemptions under Article 85(3). This power "forms the
very heart of the Community's competition policy," and its exer-
cise requires a "qualified judgment as to the interests of the
Community as a whole." 35 In applying Article 85(3), DG IV
takes the position that it is able to "ensure that the core of Com-
munity competition policy remains identical throughout the
Community," thus preventing "forum shopping and thus artifi-
cial distortions of capital flows. 1' 36 Moreover, if the Member
States had this power, an exemption granted by one national
court or national authority would have to be respected by all
other national courts and authorities.
In recent years, the Commission has urged national courts
and national competition authorities to increase their enforce-
ment of Community competition law. Specifically, it has en-
couraged them to bring actions against agreements and prac-
tices that affect trade between the Member States, and, there-
fore, have an impact on the Community as a whole. However,
such efforts are unlikely to result in a substantial increase in na-
tional enforcement so long as the Commission retains the exclu-
sive power to grant exemptions under Article 85(3).
1. National Courts
In 1992, the Court of First Instance affirmed the right of the
Commission to decline complaints by private parties that raise
no significant Community interest and where adequate redress is
available at the national level.13 7 Pursuant to this decision, DG
IV now rejects such complaints, a policy which is expected to
lead to a significant increase in the number of Community com-
134. Lords Report, supra note 69, Memorandum of the Federal Cartel Office, at
198, para. 4(a).
135. Id. Ehlermann testimony, at 116.
136. Id. at 116-17.
137. Automec S.r.. v. E.C. Commission, Joined Cases T-24/90 & T-28/90, [1992]
E.C.R. 2223, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 431 (Ct. First Instance).
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petition law actions filed by private parties in national courts.138
Accordingly, in 1993, DG IV issued its "Notice on Cooperation
Between National Courts and the Commission in Applying Arti-
cles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty," ("Notice") 139 to aid national
courts in dealing with such cases. A DG IV working group devel-
oped the Notice and the Member State Advisory Committee re-
viewed it. It sets forth a procedure to guide national courts in
applying Community competition law.
The notice recognizes that national courts hold concurrent
power with the Commission to apply Articles 85 (1), 85 (2) and 86
through the doctrine of direct effect. National courts are re-
quired to respect the exemption decisions taken by the Commis-
sion. National courts may also apply the substantive provisions
of block exemptions, but may not themselves grant exemptions.
Thus, the notice states that "individuals and companies have ac-
cess to all procedural remedies provided for by national law on
the same conditions as would apply if a comparable breach of
national law were involved," including provisional remedies, in-
junctions, and damages.140  Such relief is not available under
Community law, which provides for only the imposition of fines.
2. National Competition Authorities
DG IV established a working group to explore ways in which
national authorities could play a greater role in enforcing Com-
munity competition law. The members of the working group
were personal appointees of the Directors-General of each of the
national competition authorities and of the Director-General of
DG IV. Its mission was to increase efficiency in the implementa-
tion of Articles 85 and 86, to determine whether decentralized
enforcement is necessary and desirable to this end, and, if so, to
establish the means for decentralized enforcement. The work-
ing group submitted a report to the Director-General of DG IV
in September 1994, which contained various non-operational
general conclusions. The report was not published, however, be-
cause it discussed many issues not yet resolved among the Mem-
ber States.
138. Lords Report, supra note 69, Ehlermann testimony, at 114.
139. Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts and the Commission in Ap-
plying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, O.J. C 39/5 (1993).
140. Id. at 11.
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The most controversial issue before the working group re-
lated to the power to grant exemptions under Article 85(3). An-
other problem related to differences in discovery powers among
the Member States and vis-a-vis the Community. The effort to
resolve such issues is expected to lead to a communication on
cooperation with the national competition authorities.
CONCLUSION
The dual competition law enforcement systems in the
United States and in the European Union can be traced to vastly
different historical roots. The future coexistence of competition
enforcers at the two levels of government in the two systems is
likely to develop along different lines.
In the European Union, the decentralization movement is
motivated by the need to find solutions to the excessive caseload
of DG IV, generated in large measure by its notification system,
which its own machinery cannot handle. The Commission views
decentralized enforcement by national authorities and the
courts as a way to cope with the problem. But at the same time,
the Commission encourages decentralized enforcement. It
seeks to maintain a high degree of centralized control over the
system because it believes this will best promote uniformity.
Thus, the Commission argues that it must retain its authority
over the granting of exemptions under Article 85(3). To do
otherwise would result in national competition authorities ren-
dering inconsistent decisions which would, thus, lead to forum
shopping and the absence of a level playing field.
It is unlikely, however, that decentralized enforcement can
be accomplished under current conditions. Most Member States
lack a strong antitrust tradition. Instead, national competition
authorities prefer to enforce national law because it is consistent
with their cultural and economic background and with their ex-
perience and may allow greater freedom in their decision-mak-
ing. Moreover, they gain no advantage from relying on Commu-
nity law rather than national law in prosecuting competition law
violations unless the acts at issue violate community law but not
national law. Community law provides no separate remedies;
the remedies which apply are those provided under national law.
Most Member States have not even enacted enabling legislation
1996]
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which would allow them to rely on Community law. Those that
have enacted enabling legislation have made little use of it.
The disincentives to national authorities regarding enforc-
ing Community law under such circumstances are considerable.
While they are not able to grant exemptions under Article 85 (3),
they could decide that a violation exists under Article 85(1) only
to find that it is later undermined if the Commission grants an
exemption under Article 85(3).4 The Commission could initi-
ate a proceeding in the same matter at any time, which would
curtail the national authority's proceedings under Community
law.
Unlike the situation in the EU Member States, the antitrust
tradition in the U.S. states is well developed, based on common
cultural and economic foundations and a shared national his-
tory. Conflicts between state and federal enforcers have been
based on policy differences and the antitrust tradition in the
states has proved to be a strong force during the Reagan years of
federal non-enforcement. While state antitrust laws may differ
in their particular provisions, they share a common core which is
sufficiently well-defined, allowing states to identify and pursue
their interests as a group, even when they are at odds with fed-
eral enforcers.
Moreover, the incentives to the states to enforce federal an-
titrust law are strong. Prosecuting violations of federal law allows
them to file actions in federal courts, where federal antitrust pre-
cedent is binding and judges are experienced in handling com-
plex antitrust cases. Once they satisfy the jurisdictional require-
ments, they are free to prosecute their claims with the benefits
that federal law provides. They may pursue remedies provided
under federal law, such as treble damages and divestiture.
The U.S. system, however, does create the problem of over-
lapping jurisdiction between federal and state antitrust law. In-
consistent results are not considered to be threatening, with the
possible exception of mergers, because interpretation of state
law often relies on federal precedent. In addition, arguments in
antitrust cases are based on economic considerations, which are
equivocal, whether made in federal or state court, under federal
or state law.
141. Of course, the grant of an exemption would also nullify a ruling under Mem-
ber State law which comes to an inconsistent conclusion.
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Although resource limitations in the United States constrain
federal enforcers from accomplishing all that they would like,
federal enforcers have never viewed enforcement of federal law
by state attorneys general as the solution to this problem.
Rather, they have relied upon their own resources in the Wash-
ington headquarters, their field offices throughout the United
States, and the offices of the U.S. attorneys. Moreover, they are
better able to set priorities than their EU counterparts because
they are not burdened with a notification system which gener-
ates countless hours of fruitless labor.
Federal officials view as desirable collaboration and coordi-
nation with state attorneys general because it results in a more
efficient use of enforcement resources, increases the likelihood
of consistent results, and benefits the business community.
Through the efforts of the NAAG and federal enforcers, collabo-
ration efforts have grown and taken new forms. In recent years,
joint investigations, joint filings, new systems for sharing infor-
mation, institutional innovations, and amicus brief programs all
evidence a new era of federal-state cooperation.
The EU Member States could reap similar benefits from
forming their own association of heads of national competition
authorities. Rather than always reacting to proposals from the
Commission, it would provide them with a forum for developing
their own proposals. It would allow them to identify areas of
common interest which do not involve the Commission, such as
sharing information in merger and other cases within their juris-
diction. It would also allow them to work towards common posi-
tions in resolving issues with the Commission. Such an organiza-
tion could greatly aid the development of a stronger competi-
tion enforcement orientation among all of the Member States.
Finally, the European Union should consider the creation of a
regional court system which would have jurisdiction to consider
not only competition cases brought under Community law, but
also those brought under national law, through a mechanism
such as removal jurisdiction.
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